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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
FRANK R GEORGE doing business as ) 
FRANK GEORGE AND SONS ) 
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, ) 
) 
Plaintiff-Respondent ) 
) PETITION FOR REHEARING 
vs ) 
) Case No. 18359 
OREN LIMITED AND ASSOCIATES, ) 




Pursuant to the provisions of Rule 76(e), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
the Plaintiff-Respondent petitions the Court for a rehearing in this matter. 
The decision of the Court was filed August 29, 1983. In that decision, the 
Court erred in the following particulars: 
1. The Court's decision recognizes and grants judgment in favor of 
the Defendant (i.e. a dismissal of the action) on the basis of 
11 illegality 11 of contract, which affirmative defense must be pleaded. 
J 
Defendant waived this "defense" by its failure to plead the same. 
See Rules 12(h) and 8(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
2. The decision assumes, incorrectly and contrary to the evidence adduced 
at trial, that the licensing statute afforded "protection" to the 
Defendant. 
3. The decision misunderstands at least one significant fact which would 
otherwise bring the case within existing law so as to allow Plaintiff 
his recovery. 
4. The decision fails to take into account the fact that the Plaintiff 
should be compensated for the value of the materials he "sold" to the 
Defendant (i.e. the water and sewer pipes), irrespective of his 
unlicensed status which is of importance only to recovery for personal 
services rendered in installing said pipes. 
Respectfully submitted this 16th day of September, 1983. 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
FRANK R GEORGE doing business as ) 
FRANK GEORGE AND SONS ) 






OREN LIMITED AND ASSOCIATES, ) 




OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN 
SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR REHEARING 
Case No. 18359 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
POINT I 
THE DECISION ASSUMES, INCORRECTLY 
AND CONTRARY TO THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED 
AT TRIAL, THAT THE LICENSING STATUTE 
AFFORDED PROTECTION TO THE DEFENDANT 
The Court's decision places great emphasis upon the assumption that 
the licensing statute [Section 58-23-1 et seq, Utah Code Annotated] provided 
the Defendant with "protection" and thus the Plaintiff should be precluded 
from any recovery. This is certainly an incorrect assumption, patently contrary 
to the evidence adduced at trial. 
First, the "unlicensed" status of the Plaintiff was not even raised until 
on the eve of trial. The "defense" was raised only via the general "failure 
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted" basis. Plaintiff's Complaint 
does state a valid claim---irrespective of the "unlicensed" status; see Point II, 
below. This should be contrasted with the requirements of Rule 8(c), which requires· 
the Defendant to affirmatively plead the following defenses: failure of consideratio 
illegality, license, and any other 11 matter constituting an avoidance or affirmative 
defense." ilrhe Defendant's failure to "affinnatively plead" these defenses, 
espfttia-lly tne"megaKty11 defense herein raised, operates as a waiver of Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
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that defense. See Rule 12(h), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Secondly, the evidence adduced at trial indicated that the Department of 
Business Regulation had NEVER INSPECTED subdivision work (i.e. the grading of 
roads and the installation of water and sewer lines) in Fannington City. See 
the testimony of Mr Walter Clock, Fannington City Building Inspector for five 
and one-half years. Transcript pp. 92-93. 
This second point is particularly significant when one considers the FACT 
that the Defendant had the opportunity to present evidence showing that it was 
injured. by the Plaintiff. Indeed, the Defendant took that opportunity! Much 
testimony was given by the Defendant's agents that the Plaintiff "delayed" 
performance of his end of the bargain. THESE CLAIMS WERE PRESENTED TO, BUT 
REJECTED BY, THE JURY. No authority is needed for the principle that a verdict, 
especially a jury verdict, is, on appeal, analyzed in a light most favorable to 
the prevailing party---the Plaintiff. 
No evidence was presented by the Defendant to show that the Department of 
Business Regulation would have "protected" the Defendant in any particular. I 
submit that the Department would not take any action---with respect to the Plaintiff, 
had he been licensed---on the basis of the "alleged delay". In fact, by that time, 
the damage (that is, alleged "damage") to Defendant had already been co11111itted and 
it would be left up to the judicial system (which has the appropriate tools and 
skills to resolve the dispute) to handle the matter. Had the Plaintiff been 
licensed, the 11 bond 11 he would have been required to post with the Department would 
have been so minimimal as to be insignificant when compared against the Defendant's 
counterclaim of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND DOLLARS! The licensing statute doesn't 
even come closing to providing the Defendant with that kind of "protection". 
This is especially true when the Defendant is given opportunity at trial to 
assert EVERY DEFENSE IT HAS against payment under the contract. If the workmanship 
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were (which, by reason of the jury verdict, the Court must conclude that 
it, in fact, was not) 11 faulty 11 in some particular, the Defendant has the 
opportunity to show it in trial and avoid payment. Indeed, the Defendant made 
such a claim: considerable time was spent presenting evidence concerning 
whether the sewer line had a leak at some unknown location. Obviously, the 
jury found in favor of the Plaintiff on that issue. But the point really is: 
the judicial forum affords the Defendant the "protection" he needs against 
faulty workmanship, etc., occurring in the job he has contracted for. The 
Defendant's "day in court", with his full panoply of rights (discovery, cross-
examination of witnesses, representation by counsel, and lastly: a trial by 
jury), is much better "protection" than the licensing statute will ever 
afford the Defendant. 
On the other hand, the Court's decision "slams the door in the face" of 
the Plaintiff on a hypertechnical interpretation of a statute, which, by its 
tenns, isn't even applicable here. [The statute specifies that contracting without 
a license is a misdemeanor;.a penalty of imprisonment and $299 fine is specified 
for its violation. That shows what the Legislature feels about the problem---
and that's only after the offender, who is assumed to be innocent, is first 
prosecuted and then convicted. Yet the Court, by judicial decision, has now 
created a PENALTY TWO HUNDRED TIMES GREATER than the fine the Legislature has 
specified. As indicated earlier, the rule in Utah has been that the "law does 
not favor a forfeiture, and thus, statutes imposing such are to be strictly 
construed." The Court's decision certainly does not adhere to that principle.] 
While the Plaintiff's "unlicensed" status for the lengthy period of time is 
perhaps not to be encouraged, it is improper for the Court to fashion a decision 
which, by operating from an impractical theoretical basis divorced from the 
established realities of the situation, "punishes" the Plaintiff and "rewards" 
the Defencfant---who sonta,may say would be guilty of "theft" for having instructed Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
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the Plaintiff to continue with the work, when the Defendant should have known 
there would be no money with which to pay the Plaintiff. [Indeed, the Defendant's 
agents, some eight months after the work (installation of water and sewer lines) 
was terminated in the fall of 1979, indicated to the Plaintiff to go to Farmington 
City to be paid for the work he had done. See Exhibit "K".] 
Indeed, the licensing statute has become, in the words of Justice Wilkins 
speaking for a unanimous Court in Fillmore Products, "an unwarranted shield for 
the avoidance of a just obligation." 561 P.2d at 690. The instant decision---
showing little flexibility and almost no recognition for equity and justice---
is certainly a significant retreat from the more enlightened approach taken in 
'Fillmore Products and Lignell. 
The instant decision attempts to distinguish Fillmore Products and Lignell 
from the present factual and legal setting. It must be conceded that those two cases 
are different; it is highly unlikely that counsel would be able to come up with a 
case decision which was "on all fours" with the present situation. [Had there been 
such a case, there would have likely been no appeal.] But the fact that there are 
differences IGNORES THE PRINCIPLE that it is the similarities which are important: 
THE important similarity is the "protection" found by the trial judge and implicitly 
recognized by the jury. The fact that there was alternate "protection" for the 
Defendant (via the inspections and acceptance of Farmington City) is what is important 
in the application of the principles of law from Fillmore Products and Lignell; the 
factual differences as to how that protection is established is inconsequential. 
On this point, the Court's decision, attempting to analyze the distinctions to 
be drawn between the former two cases and the instant situation, IS INCORRECT on a 
critical factual issue. The Court states, at p. 6 of the decision, in footnote 9: 
It is noted that in the instant case the City's project engineer 
designed the improvements to be installed by Plaintiff. The engineer 
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did not, however, inspect thw work and does not appear from 
the record to have had any responsibility, with respect to 
the project, beyond his designing function. In contrast, the 
the project engineer in the Fillmore Products case was a 
licensed private engineering firm known as Call Engineering, 
Inc., which did have an inspection responsibility with respect 
to the construction work. 
This misunderstanding may have arisen because the parties to the litigation 
glossed over the issue because it was not in dispute and was, in essence, a 
"given". The project was designed by Jim Byrd of Byrd Engineering; he was 
the engineer selected .Qy. the Defendant to do the design and engineering 
work for the subdivision. Although the Fannington City engineer (Jim Byrd 
IS NOT the City Engineer) had to approve Mr Byrd's drawings and design, before 
construction could begin, it was THE DEFENDANT'S ENGINEER which designed the 
project. But the "design" is not critical to the "protection" issue, per se, 
although it does provide some relevance: the water and sewer lines had to 
be installed in only one way---the way shown on the drawings. Those drawings 
detailed the required materials and installation. Any variance therefrom by 
the contractor would have constituted a breach of the contract, or as a 
minimum justified some kind of set-off. Although the Defendant made such a 
claim, none was shown; the jury found in Plaintiff's favor. The major emphasis 
of the Defendant's claim of breach had to do with "time of performance", rather 
than the 11 quality 11 (or lack thereof) of Plaintiff's workmanship. 
Once work was begun, the FARMINGTON CITY inspector took over; he did 
the inspections. The "design engineer" (Byrd) had nothing to do with the 
project. [See Transcript, p. 16]. This point is significant because Fannington 
City---which was going to be the intended future owner of the water lines and 
the sewer lines installed by the Plaintiff---did not want to "inherit" [the 
"subdivision" approval and development process, as implemented by Utah 
municipalities, requires that the developer install, at his expense, these 
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improvements, which are then "dedicated" to the municipality] a defective line 
which the City would thereafter have to maintain. Thus, the Farmington City 
inspector (not the project engineer[Byrd]) made the inspections. Certainly the 
City inspector [Mr Clock], acting at the direction and under the supervision of 
his employer---Fannington City---which has its own engineer, is going to be just 
as careful in inspecting the work as a "licensed private engineering firm" which 
made the inspections in Fillmore Products. In fact, the City inspector is going to 
actually be "more strict" in adhering to quality because his City is going to have 
to live with the problem, if he slips up and allows one to go by. That city inspector 
is not going to do that. Thus, the''protection" is present. 
The trial judge recognized these facts and accepted this legal principle when 
he wrote [which is also quoted on p. 6 of the Court's decision], in part: 
. . . and defendant was adequately protected by reason of the 
fact that the project had to be tested and approved .Qi: the Fannington 
City Engineer. 
Emphasis is mine. 
The Court should base its decision UPON A CORRECT INTERPETATION OF THE FACTS. 
When that is done, it will be recognized that the instant situation comes within 
the parameters established by Fillmore Products and Lignell. The trial judge, in 
an advantaged position to hear the entire case, recognized such. This Court should 
reconsider the factual evidence and should base the decision upon those facts. As 
a minimum, page 6 of the Court's decision should be modified so as to correspond to 
the true facts. 
POINT II 
THE PLAINTIFF SHOULD BE ALLOWED 
TO RECOVER FOR THE VALUE OF THE 
"MATERIALS FURNISHED" TO THE 
DEFENDANT, REGARDLESS OF HIS 
"UNLICENSED" STATUS WHICH SHOULD 
PERTAIN ONLY TO RECOVERY FOR THE 
"SERVICES RENDERED" IN INSTALLATI Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
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The Court's decision correctly framed the competing claims of the parties 
in this litigation. To quote from page l of the Court's decision: 
Plaintiff Frank R. George, dba George & Son Construction, 
brought this action to recover sums alleged due for services and 
materials provided in the installation of improvements upon 
defendant's property, and for a lien against the property so 
served. Defendant Oren Limited & Associates counterclaimed for 
damages upon a theory that ~laintiff's alleged untimely perfonnance 
constituted~ breach of· contract •..• 
Emphasis is mine. Yet the "bottom line" of the Court's decision is that 
the Plaintiff is DENIED ANY RECOVERY---ABSOLUTELY, NO QUESTIONS ASKED!! As 
such, this result is patently unfair. 
Part of his claim for money was FOR THE COST OF THE MATERIALS ACTUALLY 
INSTALLED: the pipes for the water and sewer 11 lines 11 • 
Certainly his "unlicensed" status has no bearing on the fact that he has 
delivered to the:·Defendant a valuable product. The licensing statute only 
pertains to those who "engage in the business of contracting" (that is, who 
agree to do 11 work 11 ). It does NOT APPLY to persons who sell PRODUCTS. There is 
an obvious reason why the licensing ·statute applies only to 11 contractors 11 : the 
Legislature was aware that oftentimes the "workmanship" (being a subjective 
issue) was less than desirable. On the other hand, a tangible product (and the 
selling of such product) does not require state regulation because it is 
more "objective": the buyer can simply look to see what he is getting and 
may refuse to purchase it if disatisfied with the quality. 
In the instant situation, the Plaintiff is penalized in his "merchant" 
capacity merely because he had the misfortune of being 11 unlicensed 11 in his 
"contractor" capacity. There is no equitable reason why the Defendant should 
be allowed to retain the 11 product 11 (the pipe), merely because an "unclean" 
person (that is, the unlicensed contractor) has touched it. The Defendant 
simply should not ,be entitled to such a 11windfall 11 ; the Court should act to 
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such an unjust enrichment. Certainly the Defendant would not be allowed 
to retain possession of the pipe---without paying for the same---if the 
Defendant had purchased the pipe from another 11 merchant11 and then permitted 
(i.e. "contracted with") the "unlicensed" Plaintiff to install it! 
The Court should allow the Plaintiff to retrieve the water and sewer 
lines so installed. [It was these lines for which payment was not made and 
suit was brought. For the other improvements, such as the grading work, etc., 
payment was made.] The Court must not think that such a retrieval is not 
possible. The 11 subdivision 11 in this case is NOT presently what one nonnally 
thinks of when the word 11 subdivision 11 is mentioned: paved streets, sidewalks, 
kids riding bikes in the street lined with homes. That is not the present 
condition of the subdivision. The 11 subdivision 11 is [probably because of the 
lack of money on the part of the Defendant to continue with the installation 
of the improvements] in basically the same condition as it was in when the 
Plaintiff 11 pulled off the job" because he wasn't paid: there are NO paved 
streets; there are NO sidwalks; there are NO homes lining the streets; there 
are NO residents dependent upon the water and sewer lines. The 11 subdivision 11 
is simply a field with a water line and a sewer line running through it. 
Retrieval of those pipes can be accomplished. It should be allowed. The 
Defendant should not be allowed to retain the pipe merely because the unlicensed 
contractor installed them. 
CONCLUSION 
As a minimum, the Court should amend its decision so as to accurately 
reflect and take into account the operative facts. When those facts are 
considered, it must be noted that the Defendant had considerably more 11 protection 11 
afforded to it by virtue of the Fannington City inspections and acceptance than 
would be afforded via licensing with the state agency, which, as shown by 
the evidence, has nothing to do with subdivision work. Indeed, the entite Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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judicial process "protects" the Defendant against faulty or defective 
workmanship much more than any assumed protection via the licensing statute. 
The Defendant had a plenary opportunity to allege "faulty or defective" 
workmanship on the part of the Plaintiff; the jury verdict in favor of the 
Plaintiff must be construed to evidence the lack of merit to Defendant's 
claims on that issue. Indeed, the only "defense" really vigorously asserted 
pertained only to "time of perfonnance", and not "quality". It is highly 
suspect to think the licensing statute afforded any "protection" on that 
issue, especially in light of the complete judicial proceedings and disposition. 
Further, the Defendant has "waived" its right to assert the "illegality" 
and these other "defenses" by reason of its failure to 11 affinnatively plead" 
the same, as required by the Rules. 
The Court should not retreat from the enlightened decisions recently-decided 
and return to the one adhering to "mechanical application" of techicalities 
which operate to frustrate justice and equity. The Defendant received exactly 
what it bargained for: a water and sewer line acceptable to Fannington City. 
The jury verdict found there was no unreasonable delay. The instant decision, 
if not modified, works a tremendous "forfeiture" upon the Plaintiff and exacts 
a financial penalty upon him two-hundred fold of that intended by the Legislature, 
while at the same time "rewarding" the certainly questionable (criminal? ethical? 
moral?) conduct of the Defendant of continuing to have the Plaintiff work when 
the Defendant knew there would be no funds for payment. The Court should remedy 
this situation. Equity and fairness demands such. The present decision has become 
11 an unwarranted shield for the avoidance of a just obligation." 
In the alternative, the Court should allow the Plaintiff to retrieve the 
pipe from the Defendant. The licensing statute was never intended to provide 
protection in the "merchant" capacity. 
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The judgment of the trial court, rendered upon the jury verdict received after 
two day's trial in which all relevant issues (i.e. defenses: defective and/or untimely 
perfonnance justifies non-payment) were raised, should be affinned. The Plaintiff 
should be awarded the amount determined by the jury, plus interest, costs and 
attorney's fees. 
Respectfully submitted this 16th day of September, 1983. 
CERTIFICATE 
I certify that I hand-delivered two copies of the foregoing PETITION FOR REHEARING and 
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR REHEARING to the 
office of Mr Lorin N Pace, Attorney for Defendant-Repondent, 136 E. South Temple 
Street, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 this 16th day of September, 1983. 
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